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Foreword
From 2012 to 2015, I worked for an Urdu language and culture homestay program in an
Indian metropolis. As my ears began to make sense of the voices of the bustling and heady
multitudes, so did society’s anthropology unwind into many strands of belief, praxis, ethnicity,
and clan; like gathering with like. A world apart from them all were the Bangladeshis.
Distinguished by their fervent hospitality and keen conversation, Bangladeshi migrants in
my neighborhood became my closest friends as they quietly shared glimpses of their life stories
to me over chai and fried veg pakora, hinting here and there at their perhaps less than legal
immigration status keeping them from going back, even once, to the land of their birth.
Sometimes they would tell me stories of heartbreak they never shared with their own kindred.
The greatest need of the nameless, it seemed, was to be named, heard, and known.
I suppose I am still trying to make their stories known today. Dr. Aaron Shew granted me
use of data from a survey of Bangladesh’s polders and guided me to let the data tell the story of
why so many from Bangladesh leave, never to return. The rising seas just south of Bangladesh
menace the land, and the crumbling earth no longer supports the feet atop it. The data tell the
story of how society’s divisions reinforce the dangers of the changing world environment. The
environmental drivers for migration seem to strike in every country along society’s fault lines.
This led me to wrestle with the headlines of nativist hostility worldwide. Climate migration from
Central America coincided with America First politics. India, my second home, rumbles more
and more with ill portents for its Muslim minority, initialized by the unauthorized cross-border
movement of Muslim laborers. Among those in the crosshairs are the many Bengalis, some
properly documented, some less so, who I counted on in confidence as my closest friends in
Nizamuddin Basti, Delhi.

It is my hope that uncovering the link between climate and migration will spur us to
consider our own policies towards those driven off their land by the desperation of climatechange induced poverty, insecurity, and war.
As famed Indian author and opposition activist Arundhati Roy writes,

“Another world is not only possible; she is on her way. Maybe many of us won’t be here
to greet her, but on a quiet day, if I listen very carefully, I can hear her breathing.”
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To the Byers family and Khuda: I am in your debt of grace.
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Chapter 1: Signposts
The aim of this thesis is to dive deeply into a climate-vulnerable human population to
determine the strength of environmental drivers of migration and discern whether planned or
catastrophic migration is now predominantly occurring.
Chapter two comprises the background and quantitative analysis. The chapter begins with
the scale of the climate migration issue, the importance of the study area in Southwest
Bangladesh, the theorization of environmental migration, source data provenance, data
description and conceptual-empirical model for econometric analysis. What follows is a
discussion and analysis of the most significant migration drivers.
Chapter three unpacks an unexpected result of the study: the chief salience of religious
affiliation for migration decision. I theorize why religious affiliation appears to be a strong
selector for emigration in the study area within Bangladesh. This chapter connects the local issue
of religious differences in household capacity within our study area with the structural
geopolitics surrounding the immigration issue regionally. Religion is highly politicized in South
Asia.
Chapter four explores the political impacts of the global climate migration issue by
focusing on migration from Bangladesh to two Indian border states. I apply the framework of
host-migrant proximity to the two largest receiving areas for Bangladeshi migrants across the
Indian border, Assam and West Bengal states. These proximities help explain the history of the
presence/absence of nativist political violence against Bangladeshi immigrants and the recent
instrumentalization of religious identity for citizenship in India. I discuss the purpose and impact
of India’s border militarization and how, more broadly, it represents an increasingly popular
authoritarian response to global climate migration. I connect climate, conflict, and
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authoritarianism, concluding with a brief discussion of state versus civil society roles in the
crisis.
Chapter 2: Econometric Analysis of Bangladesh Polders
1. Introduction
Over 105 million people live in the Ganges Delta, more than 8 million of whom live on
polders constructed by Bangladesh through a national campaign for flood defense in the 1960s
(Edmonds et al., 2020; Mainuddin et al., 2021). These artificial islands (polders)—all less than
10 meters above sea level, many beneath it—house a population that may be the world’s most
vulnerable to climate change. Cyclonic deluge, sea level rise, increasingly erratic monsoons,
drought, and salinification are the backdrop to a stark rise in emigration, even as Bangladesh
seeks to bridge a yawning gap in rice imports by prodding—and funding—farmers to stay on the
polders.
Through an econometric analysis of a 2016 USAID cross-sectional survey of a thousand
households living on the polders, I ascertain the environmental pressures influencing emigration
and identify the magnitude of their effects. I gauge the power of these forces against those of key
socio-economic push and pull factors to determine whether the resident populations are in the
midst of planned or catastrophic environmental migration.
1.1 The Scale of Climate Migration
Climate-driven migration is the current and worsening reality of the 21 st Century. In the
last decade, 21 million people each year were forcibly displaced by climatic hazard worldwide
(The White House, 2021), and ten times that amount are projected to move by 2050 (Rigaud et
al., 2018). South and East Asians comprised 85 percent of those affected by climate
displacement in 2015 alone (The White House, 2021).
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Migration is no geophysical process but rather a social phenomenon of risk perception
and community response (Adger et al., 2021; Z. Ahmed et al., 2022). Environmental impacts
tend to increase already existing migration flows while exacerbating social inequalities inherent
in societies sending and receiving migrants. The dynamic interplay between economic, political,
demographic, social, and environmental drivers, and the complex social trends emerging
therefrom, generate migrant outflows from an affected area (Black et al., 2011). Climate
scientists have recently identified the 339 million people living on river deltas worldwide as
those most exposed to the climate impacts, 97% living in least-developed economies, 89% in the
latitude of most tropical cyclones, over 105 million of whom live on the Ganges-Brahmaputra
delta shared by India and Bangladesh (Edmonds et al., 2020). 86 million or more have moved
into the high-risk zone between 2000-2017: the number of at-risk people is likely only to
increase within the next decades, even as the intensity of climate impacts increases ever more
(ibid., 4).
Emerging climate research shows, increasingly, that climate change amplifies global
conflict through the economic price signal of food: the decreased productivity of land, the
sudden ejection of rural populations to the cities, and the public’s intensified reliance on everpricier government subsidies to manage the precipitous rise in food prices, triggering unrest
against the state and even against perceived immigrants whenever the price of staple foods climb
out of reach for the working poor (Buhaug & von Uexkull, 2021; Koubi, 2019; Petrova, 2021;
Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014). By 2100, for example, India is projected to become the most
populous nation at the same time as its key staple crop yields in rice will decrease by a sixth,
wheat by a fifth, and lentil by a quarter due to hotter climates (Birthal et al., 2014). Within
present-day India, we already see mass protests against lifting agricultural subsidies and episodes
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of increasing mob violence channeled along religious and communal lines (Ayyub, 2021; Iffat,
2021; Oza, 2007; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014; Ziegler, 2013). Climate change intensifies the
price signal of farm failure, food price increase, migration, and conflict. It will be vital to grasp
the systemic linkage of agricultural stress and emigration stemming from climate change in the
oncoming decades. Global climate migration models predict South Asia alone will host 40
million internal refugees—predominantly failed agriculturalists—with Bangladesh the foremost
nation affected worldwide (Rigaud et al., 2018).
1.2 Why Bangladesh Matters
Half of Bangladesh’s people live in a Low Elevation Coastal Zone (LECZ), no higher
than 10 meters above sea level, at high risk of displacement by the rising seas and more intense
storms predicted in future CO2 emission scenarios (J. Chen & Mueller, 2018, 2019). The
increasingly unseasonable Southwest Asian Monsoon will bring simultaneously greater flooding
to Bangladesh and greater propensity for drought, resulting in increased salinization of land as
seawater from the Bay of Bengal intrudes upriver in the dry season, catastrophically eliminating
crop productivity (Cornwall, 2018; Islam et al., 2019; Khan et al., 2021; Mainuddin et al., 2022;
Mondol et al., 2021; Schwartz, 2021).
Bangladesh’s population is enormously concentrated in areas of risk. Comprising 165
million, just over half the population of the USA, in a country the size of Iowa, about two-thirds
of Bangladeshis reside in rural areas, a density of 1,200 people on average per km 2 (Shew et al.,
2019, World Bank 2020). Despite its hundred-million-strong workforce farming in the world’s
fourth-largest rice producing country, despite half of its population engaged in rice cultivation,
Bangladesh has never been self-sufficient in this vital crop and is experiencing a widening
import gap, along with record high prices (FAO, 2017; Shew & Ghosh, 2019). A recent study by
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Khan et. al (2021) estimated that 4.1 million Bangladeshis were displaced by climate disasters in
2019, 13.3 million could be displaced by 2050, and 18% of its coastland will disappear
underwater by 2080 (Khan et al., 2021). It is for these reasons that both the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the World Bank have identified Bangladesh as the most
vulnerable, exposed, and least climate-resilient country within Asia (Rigaud et al., 2018).
1.3 Khulna’s Polders and Our Study
Along the southern coast of Bangladesh lie 139 polders, 3 million acres of artificially
embanked islands raised above the sea by Bangladesh’s Coastal Embankment Project (CEP) in
the 1960s and 70s to guard the Ganges-Brahmaputra river delta from salinity, storm, and
seawater (Assefa et al., 2021; Mondal et al., 2006; Yadav et al., 2020). The estimated 8 million
farmers who work the soil of these polders are on the ramparts of climate change, a major focus
for agricultural intervention in order to tighten the rice yield gap within Bangladesh (Cornwall,
2018; Shew et al., 2019).
The polder region is the least intensified and least productive of Bangladesh’s ricegrowing regions: the prime agricultural intervention area by the central government to stabilize
the systems of internal canals, sluice gates, and local cooperative water management groups to
increase agricultural productivity (Assefa et al., 2021; Yadav et al., 2020). In the past decade,
Bangladesh has partnered with the Dutch Government to sponsor intervention within the
vulnerable southwest polders through “Blue Gold,” a local cooperative water management
organization, in the process commissioning a 2016 cross-sectional survey in three polders
(“Number 28/1,” “Number 28/2,” and “Number 30”) before undertaking the revitalization of
physical and social hydraulic management infrastructures (Thomas, 2020). This three-polder
survey is our source data for analysis.
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This 2016 cross-sectional survey, funded by the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) and conducted by teams from the International Rice Research Institute
(IRRI-Philippines) and the International Water Management Institute (IWMI-Sri Lanka), focuses
primarily on economic health and rural infrastructure performance but includes numerous
questions on climate change impact perceptions and migration. A 600-question snapshot of 1,025
households in three polders of Southwest Bangladesh, the survey represents an in-depth view
into the nature of ongoing climate migration decisions among the world’s arguably most climatevulnerable people.
Policy stakeholders are increasingly facing the problem of vulnerability directly: the
Government of Bangladesh allocated $1 billion of its 2018-19 fiscal year budget to directly
address the climate change threat (Ravi, 2021). There is a significant role for scientists to advise
policymakers by providing an in-depth characterization of migration drivers within highly
vulnerable agrarian districts that will be the most likely to experience mass emigration in the
coming decades (J. Chen & Mueller, 2019). Understanding climatic drivers of migration, and
how they align with socioeconomic capacities, helps decisionmakers enable migration of choice
and ameliorate catastrophic unplanned migration. The findings of this paper’s analysis should
shape future IRRI / IWMI interventions and Government of Bangladesh funding priorities within
the vulnerable coastal region to minimize catastrophic and maximize planned migration.
We now turn to the distinction in the two and describe the theorization undergirding our
hypotheses and methods.
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2. Theorization
2.1 Migration Theory: New Economics of Labor Migration & Capability Theory
We base our analysis on the migration theory of the World Bank’s 2018 Groundswell
Report team, which relies foremost on both Stark and Bloom’s New Economics of Labor and
Amartya Sen’s Capability theories of migration (Bonfanti, 2014; Hamilton, 2019; Massey et al.,
1993; Rigaud et al., 2018; Sen, 2000; Stark & Bloom, 1985). We also utilize Jon Barnett’s
concept of climate maladaptation to situate desirable versus undesirable channels of migration
(Barnett & O’Neill, 2010).
Our theorization informs our analysis by concluding that a) households are the basis for
decision-making, b) income risk reduction strategies are the primary motive for migration from
our study area, c) there are empirically measurable economic indicators distinguishing between
migration of choice and forced migration, d) our study area population has distinct climate
vulnerabilities based on its social and environmental capacities, e) acute, fast-onset disasters
(storms and floods) will tend to reduce emigration while slow-onset disasters (soil salinization,
crop pest infestation, drought) will generate emigration, through the prime mechanism of
systemic agricultural degradation, and f) planned migration is preferable to catastrophic
migration as it reduces maladaptation through preserving household wealth rather than
destroying it.
This theorization guides the aims of our analysis to measure the current magnitude of
slow-onset climate migration effects within the coastal Bangladesh study area. As we will see in
the next section on data description, our analysis contributes to the wider research by intensively
analyzing a high-emigration population in a medium-salinity agriculture area. Its impact is to
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identify the distinct climate vulnerabilities of the polder zone in Bangladesh, providing a sharper
focus for policymakers to address the drivers of, and ameliorate, climatically forced migration.
2.1.1. The Contribution of the New Economics of Labor Migration Theory: Migration is a
Household Risk Reduction Strategy
Stark and Bloom’s New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory argues that
migration is not a self-determined but rather a community decision due its attendant high costs
and risks (Massey et al., 1993). To reflect the power of community decision, our analysis
considers the household head the primary decision-making unit. NELM assumes that the
household collectively chooses to maximize combined household income in order to reduce the
risk of an income loss (Assaduzzaman et al., 2020), calibrating the risk calculus to the economic
barriers of various forms of migration. Permanent migration abroad has the greatest risk, so we
must assume that mass migration is not the chief modality of environmental migration: more
often, families facing economic pressures from environmental causes will opt for seasonal, shortdistance, or domestic urban migration (J. Chen & Mueller, 2019; Cundill et al., 2021; Kaczan &
Orgill-Meyer, 2020).
NELM theory fits the quantitative findings of researchers Chen and Mueller that
migration from coastal Bangladesh is rarely across national borders, frequently seasonal rather
than permanent, and often not geographically distant from the (materially poor) communities of
the coast, primarily due to the prohibitively high up-front financial and educational costs and the
income uncertainty regarding cross-border, permanent moves (Gray and Mueller 2012; Chen et
al. 2017; Chen and Mueller 2018, 2018, 2019). Households prefer to minimize the risk of income
loss in funding migration; high-stakes international migration frequently costs much and has a
longer lead time until migrant earnings return to the sending family (Bonfanti, 2014;
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Chakraborty, 2018). Domestic migration, primarily to urban centers, is as comparatively low in
cost and risk as a train ticket or a bus ride. Lower costs influence higher numbers, and internal
migration is estimated to be at least three times higher than international migration (de Sherbinin
2020), attracting greater weight in the Groundswell Report’s climate migration modelling
(Rigaud, et al. 2018).
Why does NELM theory matter for our study? NELM implies that the basic decisionmaker is not the one who migrates, but is rather the household holistically, and moreover, the
influence of the household head in decision-making—and chiefly the father, as South Asian
societies like Bangladesh are constituted patriarchally—weighs heavy upon a decision to migrate
(Rabbani et al., 2015). It follows that the capacity of the household head to make informed
decisions matters a great deal for earnings at destination. The questionnaire used to obtain source
data for our study, accordingly, characterizes households as the basic unit of family data (not the
individual) and targets the chief stakeholder, the household head. Our analysis focuses on the
household head’s attainment status as a key marker for greater opportunities available to a
migrating family member. Towards environmental risk, the questionnaire also asks about
household perception of environmental hazards, assuming that migration is a response to an
increased household perception of hazard, a household income risk reduction decision
(Assaduzzaman et al., 2020).
2.1.2. Capability Theory: Migration is No Evil, Rather, the Constraint of Choice Is
The ability to adapt to environmental risk through migration is the concern of the
Capability Approach (Sen, 2000). Economist Amartya Sen asserts that migration is objectively
neither good nor bad on its face. Migration can enhance a migrant’s economic outcome or it can
liquidate costly assets and reduce a migrant’s status (Bonfanti, 2014). For Amartya Sen, the
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choice to move or not, and the capability to convert the opportunity to do so into a realized
decision, is the bright line between freedom and bondage (Sen, 2000). Sen says, in short, the
freedom to choose whether to stay or to go is sacrosanct. He successfully advocated that
individual agency should be the foremost aim of developmental policy frameworks: today, the
Capability Approach is the basis for international frameworks such as the Human Development
Index championed by the UN and the World Bank (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011). The utility of
the Capability Approach lies in permitting the probabilistic, rather than deterministic, response of
humankind to a migration opportunity—human agency is paramount in the science of risk—
exhorting policymakers to enable the breadth of migration response rather than enforcing either
immobility or relocation (Bonfanti, 2014). Due to the unavoidable randomness of human agency
regarding migration decisions from our study area, we use a probabilistic “probit” regression
measuring what factors enhance the likelihood, not inevitability, of migration. As we see in the
next section, not actual but perceived risk of income loss is the primary driver of climate
migration. Environmental risk is a socially amplified phenomenon. Migration is a social, not a
geophysical, phenomenon (Black et al., 2011).
To Alex de Sherbinin, a co-author of the Groundswell Report and proponent of the
Capability Theory, there is a “mobility continuum” with forced displacement (e.g. the Syrian
Civil War) at one end and opportunity migration (e.g. the Dakota Shale Boom) on the other, both
quantifiably different at either end (de Sherbinin 2020). Refugee-like circumstances are marked
by decidedly low “volitionary capacity” due to the lack of what Capability Theory calls
conversion factors, meaning social and material capital that can be converted into mobility
decisions. Overlaid upon them all are both systemic barriers and facilitators to movement. These
inhibitory/catalytic frameworks can be macro-systemic (e.g. the decadal drought of the Dust
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Bowl 1930s), removing volitional capacity from nearly all people of a region; frameworks can
persist on a meso-scale (the clan networks of the Ulster Scots when moving to the New World of
the 1700s, Stalin’s 1933 Holodomor trapping Ukrainians into mass famine), affecting one
particular class, race, religion or ethnicity; and lastly frameworks can be micro-scale, situations
which one particular household finds itself inheriting (such as a landowning grandfather, or
heirloom jewelry), enabling a conversion into, say, train tickets or a potential well-paid job
elsewhere for a migrating family member (Assaduzzaman et al., 2020; Black, Adger, et al.,
2011b; Snyder, 2010; Woodard, 2012).
Assaduzzaman and Black among many others assert that the forced migration channel
predominates among poorer societal strata due to lack of conversion factors. Migration of choice
is only available for those who surpass the crucial threshold of wealth that enables pre-planned
migration. Often the bright line separating society’s middle from its poor is the ability to
surmount the hurdle of generational poverty, in many cases, the de facto serfdom of tenant
farming which chains the poor to the land by their debts (Assaduzzaman et al., 2020; Black et al.,
2011). Tenancy factors into our analysis of migration.
Forced migration and migration of choice will be evident in our analysis by their
attendant markers of freedom (cf. shortage of food, degree of perceived climate-induced land
degradation, income level of family, number of male adult earners, salary/pension as proxy for
income stability). In close parallel are the concomitant markers of migration earnings potential
(cf. education of migrant, urban or rural destination, and whether they are earning an agricultural
or non-agricultural wage) which indicate better opportunities.
What determines the difference between forced and opportunity migration is frequently
the climate vulnerability of a community, roughly defined by its exposure to environmental
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hazard minus its physical and social capacities to withstand it. Understanding the climate
vulnerability—the degree of exposure and the socio-economic capacities of resilience—of our
study area enables us to estimate a possible climatic “tipping point” beyond which catastrophic
migration becomes inevitable, and migration of choice is no longer possible.
2.2 Climate Vulnerability, River Deltas, and Slow Versus Fast-Onset Disasters
The IPCC pioneered the framework of “climate vulnerability” to prioritize communities
such as Bangladesh that stand most squarely in the face of predicted, recurrent environmental
disasters. Climate vulnerability is a function of a community’s exposure to potential
environmental disasters minus the social and material capacities to rebuild within the community
in question (Barnett, 2020). For Degroot, a community’s resilience need not only be material, but
also social, “absorbing” environmental impacts “without losing the fundamental features and
shape of the system as a whole” (Degroot et al., 2021). As such, the environmental exposure of a
community needn’t be the supreme concern unless the society is also sensitive to impact. The
Mississippi Delta has a $14 billion post-Katrina levy system defending its population; the oilblackened Niger Delta does not (AP, 2021; Ratcliffe, 2019). Communities are climate sensitive
when they lack social and material safety nets in the form of insurance, assets, infrastructure, and
the like; in short, the most climate-sensitive are the world’s poor—a high percentage of the 300
million people who live on river deltas like Bangladesh—remain sensitive and therefore
vulnerable to the increasing tempo and magnitude of climate-linked environmental disasters
(Edmonds et al., 2020).
Exposure in our study area is reflected in four climate-change-linked environmental risk
perceptions: frequency of flooding, frequency of drought, frequency of insect/disease outbreak,
and perceived crop loss due to soil salinization. Sensitivity appears in relation to infrastructural
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robustness and income stability. And resilience is reflected in our inclusion of key
socioeconomic factors related to risk-sharing networks. These three factors compose a
community’s adaptive capacity. A community’s adaptive capacity to climate change is
modulated, in addition, by slow- and fast-onset environmental disasters which often have
opposite effects on emigration.
Slow-onset disasters (e.g. droughts, soil salinification, sea level rise, increasing
temperature extremes) are fingerprinted by the literature as the most powerful environmental
drivers of migration (Black et al. 2011; Chen et al. 2017; Rigaud et al. 2018; Kaczan and OrgillMeyer 2020; Khan et al. 2021; de Sherbinin 2021). Counterintuitively, rapid-onset disasters
(cyclones, floods, and wildfires inter alia) tend to decrease migration as household resources
which would otherwise fund potential migration is exhausted and extra labor is needed to
rebuild, an observation ground-truthed by Chen and Mueller in Bangladesh repeatedly through
remote sensing cross-verified with national census data (J. J. Chen et al., 2017; J. Chen &
Mueller, 2018a, 2018b). We expect our research to bear out that not all environmental effects
will increase migration. Acute, fast-onset disasters (storms and floods) will tend to reduce
emigration while slow-onset disasters (soil salinization, crop pest infestation, drought) will
contribute to emigration, through the prime mechanism of systemic agricultural degradation
(Rigaud et al., 2018).
We anticipate that the incidence of flooding, notably prevalent in our low-lying riverine
study area, will be the most profound environmental pressure against migration. Similarly, any
related failure in the functioning of the area’s hydraulic management systems should decrease
migration as well.
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2.3 Maladaptation and Immobility Prioritize Successful Agriculture on the Polders
Lastly, planned migration is preferable to catastrophic migration by preserving household
wealth rather than destroying it. Jon Barnett’s concept of maladaptation is a useful frame for this
idea. Barnett contributes the idea that not all climate adaptation is good adaptation.
Maladaptation is an “action taken to reduce vulnerability to climate change that…[nevertheless]
increases the vulnerability of systems, sectors, or social groups” (Barnett & O’Neill, 2010).
Among other criteria, maladaptation: a) disproportionately burdens the most vulnerable; b) opts
for costlier impacts relative to alternatives; and c) limits future adaptation options through high
path dependency. In our context, mass unplanned migration from the study area would chiefly
flow into big cities such as Dhaka, which are no less sensitive to climate environmental threats
(Rigaud et al., 2018; Ullah, 2004). Disproportionately, rural migrants occupy poorly constructed
urban slum housing vulnerable to environmental impacts, unrest, and criminal landlords (Adger
et al., 2021). Opting for total mass emigration from current agricultural land decreases staple
crop productivity, increases food prices, and burdens the state’s welfare apparatus to provide
greater, more unsustainable food subsidies (Rigaud et al., 2018; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014).
Lastly, the study area of the polders, once abandoned by smallholders, is not likely to admit
return. Nordqvist and Krampe note that within the region, seasonal emigration engenders landcapture by rapacious elites who use the law to fabricate land claims and private armies to
forcibly establish tenure (Nordqvist & Krampe, 2018). Thomas examines the recent development
of absentee land speculators buying farmland in coastal Bangladesh, influencing the adverse
operation of sluice gates to maximize salinity for their own export-oriented brine shrimping
industry (Thomas, 2020). Market forces may exacerbate perverse incentives for the powerful to
introduce negative externalities into our study area.
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Ultimately, successful adaptive interventions in our study area will reduce forced
migration by targeting the structural factors that limit choice in migration decisions; we agree
with Shew, Ahmed and others that the best adaptive intervention to our study area maximizes
household income through increased agricultural productivity and enables planned, not
unplanned, migration (Z. Ahmed et al., 2021, 2022; Shew et al., 2019). Yet, we must agree with
Assaduzzaman and coauthors that “it is not only forced migration that is problematic. A forced
option to stay is, perhaps, even worse.” (Assaduzzaman et al., 2020).
3. Methodology
3.1. Data Description
This paper seeks to answer the question: “Is climate change a major driver of migration
from our study area in coastal Bangladesh?” We analyze a 2016 survey of a coastal population
of Bangladesh performed by a team from IRRI and IWMI, supported by USAID. The survey,
focusing primarily on economic health and rural infrastructure performance, is a 600-question
point-in-time snapshot of 1,025 farmers in three polders of Southwest Bangladesh (fig. 1).
We test probable drivers for migration via a probit regression series, allowing us to see
how climate pressures are impacting a densely populated low-lying river delta on the edge of a
rising sea. As the Brahmaputra-Ganges-Meghna delta comprises one third of the 300 million atrisk deltaic flood-zone dwellers worldwide (Edmonds 2020), results will open a window to
perceptions of climate risk and migration response within this vulnerable population.
Our study relies on a probit analysis of migration. In our study, 165 (16%) of our
households reported sending one or more migrants away—87% of whom migrated individually.
The migrant’s mean age was 34 years old. Migration was primarily permanent (57%), with the
mean time of migration 3.9 years ago (range: 0.08-8.25 years). Migration has no kilometer-

16
distance threshold in the survey: having one or more members separated from the responding
household within the polder community is sufficient to define “migration.” The destination of
choice for migrants was not primarily abroad (only 18 members, or 11%), but rather to urban
areas within Bangladesh (97, or 59%), with a minority (35, or 21%) moving to other rural areas.
Our study, then, characterizes environmental impacts on primarily domestic, rural to urban
migration. We test each household’s economic, demographic, and environmental responses to
identify the main factors increasing the odds of migration. The study’s toplines are below in
Table 1.
Table 1 –Survey Toplines
Variable
Polder Number
Religion
Household Head’s Gender
Household Head’s Age

Household Head’s Literacy
Owns Farm
Migration (one or more family
member has migrated)
Type of Migration
Destination of Migrant

Duration of Migration (in
months)

Stats / Values
Polder 28/1
Polder 28/2
Polder 30
Hinduism
Islam
Female
Male
Mean: 52 years
Std Dev: 14.3
Inter-Quartile Range: 21.8
Illiterate
Literate
Has Plot Papers
No Papers
None
At Least One Migrant
(Of which, sent >1 Migrant)
Permanent
Seasonal
Urban (Domestic)
Rural (Domestic)
Abroad
More than One Location

Frequency of Response
173
16.90%
322
31.40%
530
51.70%
844
82.70%
176
17.30%
36
3.50%
989
96.50%
Min ≤ Median ≤ Max :
16 ≤ 51 ≤ 99 y
126
12.30%
899
87.70%
872
85.10%
153
14.90%
860
83.90%
165
16.10%
22
94
58.7%
71
43.0%
97
58.8%
35
21.2%
18
10.9%
12
7.0%
Min ≤ Median ≤ Max :
1 ≤ 36 ≤ 99
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Local enumerators sampled 25-26 households from 41 villages among Polders 28/1, 28/2,
and 30 on the west bank of the Kazibacha (more broadly, the Rupsha) River in the Batiaghata
upazila of Khulna district, southwest Bangladesh, for a total of 1,025 households surveyed
(figure 1, next page). Mean household size was 5.04 people. Almost one of every six households
surveyed had sent at least one migrant out of the district (16.1%), nearly triple the national rate
(6.1%) surveyed by Gray & Mueller in countrywide data (2018). Heavy outmigration underlines
our study area as a useful case study for investigating the ongoing mechanisms of climate
migration.
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Figure 1. Polder study area. Western bank of the Kazibacha River, three polders southwest of
Khulna town. (courtesy: Zobaer Ahmed)
In our study, 97% of the families still had male household heads, and this number,
combined with the low percentage of migrants who were female (4.8%), indicates that the basic
household structure in our study population is still undivided by migration. We infer that
households are still the basic unit of migration decision in this location, as accords with both
New Economics of Labor and the Capabilities theories of migration (followed by the
Groundswell report’s climate migration models) (Massey et al. 1993, Rigaud et al. 2018,
Assaduzzaman et al. 2020).
As per these theories, the most important indicators of sending capacity and wealth
should be the age of the household head (mean: 52), the household head’s literacy rate (88%),
and landownership (85%). (Farm size was highly clustered around 0.4 ha, insufficiently varied to
include it as an asset predictor.) With higher age presumably comes greater asset wealth and a
presumably higher contribution from working-age children. Literacy enables higher earning and
greater investment in children’s education (yielding better employment opportunities),
suggesting higher migration rates. In contrast to higher income, tenancy (not possessing official
deeds of title of worked land) would seem to predict migration. We expect land ownership, age,
and literacy to increase propensity to migrate.
Identifying key factors (from a bank of 600 questions) of migration in a climatevulnerable, low-income, agrarian coastal population—which is already migrating at a high rate—
allows us to create better predictions elsewhere, wherever there are agrarian populations
threatened by similar pressures.
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Initial reconnaissance of the data yields the following correlation plot (figure 2). Here we
take a glance at what tends to affect migration. Does what we see match what other authors have
observed about the socio-ecological drivers of migration?
Figure 2 – What is Driving Migration? Correlation among expected drivers

Determining which climate change drivers are the most important determinants of
migration from low-lying agricultural areas such as ours, and, secondarily, determining which
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factors most impact the poorest, is vital for predicting the worldwide forced migration of people
over the next century. If climate migration is already occurring, it is our task to determine why.
3.2 Conceptual model
Migration is the oldest pathway of climate adaptation (Black & Bennett 2011). The utility
of migration from an agriculturally degrading area confers obvious economic and even
nutritional benefits. Our data show that nearly 6 out of 10 migrants relocate to urban centers
within Bangladesh. Just as the native mangrove tree derives stability within the sediment from
roots that emerge elsewhere aboveground, families sending migrants derive remittance sources,
economic inputs for greater capital investments locally, and even another stable living space for
permanent relocation through sending migrants. In our study, a family must have a migrant
elsewhere (even temporarily) while still residing within our study area. This gives us a window
into the conditions that prevail alongside migration. Our model uses a probit model to test the
binary outcome of a family unit sending a migrant (“1”) or not (“0”) versus literature-informed,
selected factors. Coincident factors such as climatic stress possibly make migration likelier.
Drawing a picture of migration drivers present in 2016 allows us to predict what processes are
occurring presently.
Research Questions
1. Do the socio-economic variables identified in the literature (more men in the family,
greater wealth, higher elevation land) drive migration? Does food shortage
(experiencing a season of going without food) affect migration in our study area?
Prior literature identifies larger families, older household heads, greater wealth and
higher literacy as the predominant drivers of migration (Adger et al., 2021; Farhana & Mannan,
2018; Ullah, 2004). We expect to see these characteristics increase migration. In Northwest
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Bangladesh, seasonal hunger migration (monga) was identified as a major driver as well
(Sultana, 2010). If food insecurity is driving current migration out of our study area, then we
may already be witnessing a precursor of an unplanned, catastrophic migration response to
climate change.
2. What climate-change linked environmental drivers dominate the outflow of migrants
in the study area?
Previous literature contends that only long-term climatic shocks such as salinification or
drought (not short-term disasters like flooding unless they mount repeatedly in short order) push
migrants out (J. J. Chen et al., 2017). Short-term drivers like floods pin migrants down, as
households require work and use savings to rebuild, absorbing emigration potential (Kaczan &
Orgill-Meyer, 2020). We suppose salinification to be the primary driver, drought following, and
flooding to be anticorrelated with emigration (i.e., greater flooding reduces migration) in accords
with previous findings from Bangladesh (J. Chen & Mueller, 2018).
3. Do the physical and social infrastructures controlling the hydraulic landscape
(hydraulic management cooperatives, the physical condition of canals and sluice
gates) influence migration through poor functioning and increased perception of risk?
We presume that poorly operating social and physical infrastructure in the study area
(e.g., canals, drainage gates, and cooperative hydraulic governance groups) influences local
perception of climatic resilience (Yadav et al., 2020). Local perception of poor infrastructure
systems should increase migration through the pathway of increased perception of environmental
risk.
4. Does increased income, or does worse poverty, drive migration?
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Wealth predicts migration, but forced migration linked to destitution has also occurred in
the recent past, namely stemming from environmental cataclysm (Ravi, 2021). We expect to see
evidence of planned migration from those with migration capacity (wealthier households) and
unplanned migration from those without capacity (those with debt or without assets).
In our pursuit to answer these four questions with functional models, we also test nonhypothesized variables previously denoted in the literature to affect migration, for controls.
3.3 Estimation procedures/econometrics
To test the hypotheses outlined in the conceptual models above, we estimate a probit
model as outlined in equation (1).
𝑃(𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) =

1
1+ 𝑒

(1)

Here, we investigate the impacts of environmental and socio-economic drivers on
migration outcomes as specified in equation (2):
𝑌 ∗ = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑀𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 +
𝛽 𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽 𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 +
𝛽 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡 +
𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
𝛽 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
𝛽 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑀𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 +
𝛽 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀,
(2)
where 𝑌 ∗ = 1 represents a household with a migrant and 0 represents no migration, B 0 is the
intercept, and B1 through B17, are the estimated coefficients, respectively, for: 1) number of
people in household, 2) number of men in household, 3) the age of household head, 4) religion
(Hindu or Muslim) of the household, 5) household identifies as living at low elevation above sea
level, 6) household reports a season of food shortage in prior year, 7) flooding, 8) drought, 9)
insect outbreak, 10) crop destruction from soil salinization, 11) has membership in a hydraulic
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management collective, 12) condition of internal canals is 5 or less on a 10 point scale, 13)
condition of floodgates is 5 or less on a 10 point scale, 14) sharecrops rather than owns papers
for farmed land, 15) number of household men working in agriculture, 16) draws a pension or a
salary, and 17) draws income from commerce. 𝜀 represents model noise.
Focusing on environmental variables, flooding, drought, and insect outbreak are
frequency counts within the past 5 years from farmers’ self-reported answers on the 2016 source
questionnaire. Saline crop loss is a binary score reporting recognized loss from the stress of
salinization. Soil salinization is not a frequency count variable like the other environmental
variables as it is experienced as progressive crop loss according to this model. Because most
migrations occurred within the past five years (72%), environmental risk perceptions in the past
5 years will play a major role in assessing the constellation of migration drivers. The 600question survey was not primarily designed to capture migration decisions in response to climate
change impacts, but we have enough data to make conclusions about correlation.
4. Results
Our research questions were as follows: 1) Do the socio-economic variables identified in
the literature (more men, greater wealth, higher land) drive migration? Does food insecurity
determine migration in the study area? 2) What climate-change linked environmental drivers
dominate the outflow of migrants in the study area? 3) Do the physical and social hydraulic
infrastructures (water cooperatives, canals and gates) influence migration through poor
functioning and increased risk perception? 4) Do increased income, or does worse poverty, drive
migration?
The figure below (Table 2) reports our primary findings. Table 3 indicates marginal
effects of the factors we tested.
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Table 2: Factors Influencing Migration – Probit Regression Series
Intercept
Household Size
Number of Men
House Head’s Age
Household Religion
(Muslim)
Lowland
(yes, self-identified)
Food Shortage
(yes in past year)
Frequent Flooding
(count in past 5 yrs)
Frequent Drought
(count in past 5 yrs)
Frequent Insect Outbreak
(count in past 5 yrs)
Saline Crop Destruction
(yes in past 5 yrs)
Member of Water Mgmt
Group
(yes)
Poor Canal Condition
(<5 on 10 pt scale)
Poor Floodgate Condition
(<5 on 10 pt scale)
Sharecropping
(yes)
Number of Men in Agri

Base
-1.219
***
(0.076)
0.032†
(0.083)
0.088
(0.086)
0.119 *
(0.058)
0.326 *
(0.139)
0.212 `
(0.119)
0.306 *
(0.131)

Climate
-1.469
***
(0.138)
-0.005
(0.125)
0.177
(0.128)
0.157
(0.085)
0.316
(0.204)
0.512 **
(0.173)
0.156
(0.195)
-0.262 **
(0.097)
0.086
(0.086)
0.031
(0.095)
0.339 `
(0.183)

Salary or Pension
(yes)
Business or Trade Income
(yes)
n
798
409
AIC
681.868
346.547
BIC
714.643
390.698
Pseudo R2
0.060
0.159
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 ; ` p < .1
†
Beta Coefficient of Effect. (Standard errors in parentheses).

Infrastructure Income
-1.247 ***
-1.403
***
(0.104)
(0.103)
0.032
0.006
(0.084)
(0.087)
0.095
0.065
(0.088)
(0.090)
0.116 *
0.117 `
(0.059)
(0.062)
0.389 **
0.440 **
(0.142)
(0.151)
0.185
0.151
(0.121)
(0.125)
0.306 *
0.332 *
(0.133)
(0.141)

0.417 ***
(0.126)
-0.292 *
(0.115)
0.159
(0.124)

791
668.466
715.199
0.095

0.135
(0.128)
0.178 **
(0.057)
0.739 ***
(0.147)
-0.360 *
(0.182)
768
624.938
676.019
0.142

Pooled
-1.702
***
(0.214)
0.013
(0.130)
0.139
(0.134)
0.109
(0.093)
0.606 **
(0.235)
0.350`
(0.183)
0.125
(0.218)
-0.241 *
(0.103)
0.086
(0.089)
-0.051
(0.104)
0.373 `
(0.198)
0.334 `
(0.196)
-0.152
(0.179)
0.411 *
(0.180)
-0.100
(0.192)
0.163 `
(0.087)
0.499 *
(0.215)
-0.134
(0.232)
391
329.512
400.949
0.223
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Table 3: Marginal Effects of Significant Factors Influencing Migration
Household Size
Number of Men
House Head’s Age
Household Religion
(Muslim)
Lowland
(yes, self-identified)
Food Shortage
(yes, in past year)
Frequent Flooding
(count in past 5 yrs)
Frequent Drought
(count in past 5 yrs)
Frequent Insect Outbreak
(count, in past 5 yrs)
Saline Crop Destruction
(yes in past 5 yrs)
Member of Water Mgmt Group
Poor Canal Condition
(<5 on 10 pt scale)
Poor Floodgate Condition
(<5 on 10 pt scale)
Sharecropping
(yes)
Number of Men in Agri

Base
0.00†
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
0.00 *
(0.00)
0.08 *
(0.04)
0.05`
(0.03)
0.08 *
(0.04)

Climate
-0.00
(0.01)
0.03
(0.03)
0.00`
(0.00)
0.08
(0.06)
0.13 **
(0.05)
0.04
(0.05)
-0.04 **
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.08`
(0.04)

Infrastructure
0.00
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
0.00 *
(0.00)
0.10 *
(0.04)
0.04
(0.03)
0.08 *
(0.04)

0.11 **
(0.03)
-0.07 *
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)

Income
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
0.00`
(0.00)
0.11 **
(0.04)
0.03
(0.03)
0.08 *
(0.04)

Pooled
0.00
(0.01)
0.03
(0.02)
0.00
(0.00)
0.15 *
(0.07)
0.08`
(0.04)
0.03
(0.05)
-0.04 *
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.08`
(0.04)
0.08
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.04)
0.09 *
(0.04)
0.03
-0.02
(0.03)
(0.04)
0.06 ** 0.06`
(0.02)
(0.03)
0.20 *** 0.12 *
(0.05)
(0.06)
-0.07 *
-0.03
(0.03)
(0.04)
768
391
-301.47 -146.76
602.94
293.51
624.94
329.51
676.02
400.95

Salary or Pension
(yes)
Business or Trade Income
(yes)
n
798
409
791
Log Likelihood
-333.93 -162.27 -324.23
Deviance
667.87 324.55
648.47
AIC
681.87 346.55
668.47
BIC
714.64 390.70
715.20
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05.; ` p < .1
†
Numbers indicate marginal effects. (Standard errors in parentheses).
All continuous predictors are mean-centered and scaled by 1 standard deviation.
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4.1 Investigating Base Model: Results and Discussion
Our base regression employs socio-economic factors identified from the literature (Table
2: “Base” column). We expected that with a larger household, more men, higher education,
owned plots, and a larger farm, migration ought to increase. We anticipated that a higher
elevation of farmland also would increase migration through greater economic capacity (fewer
floods, more savings over time, and greater wealth to send migrants). We also tested whether
having a food shortage in the prior year would increase migration (monga or hunger migration).
We find that family size does not significantly predict migration in our study area; neither
does the number of men, the literacy of the household head (P > 0.7), nor the ownership status or
size of the farm (a proxy for income; P > 0.7). (Due to persistent high P values indicating a null
hypothesis, we excluded literacy and farm ownership status from the results table and regression
series.)
However, the age of household head is significant (p < 0.05) in our base probit model—
albeit with a very slight marginal effect. As we will see in Section 4.4, the strength of house head
age may be better explained by the number of males working in agriculture—all else equal, older
parents will have had more grown children—which strongly suggests that greater spare earning
capacity enables migration. Men are almost solely the migrant pool in our survey data (> 95% of
primary migrants). Does this suggest that the working men are migrating away to do farm jobs,
or does it suggest that more men working the family farm means better food security and better
capacity to send others out? Our base finding suggests two paths of inquiry:
1) to investigate the significance of off-farm agricultural income for migrant-associated
households (Section 4.4) and
2) to investigate food security as a requisite factor of migration (later in this section).

27
Religion is a significant factor of migration in our dataset, primarily a social signifier of
minority Muslim affiliation within a study area which is 83% Hindu. Religious minority
affiliation as a seeming selector of migration is a sensitive political issue within Bangladesh.
Chapter two expands on the implications of religious identity as a selector for migration, offering
two theories to explain its heavy significance in our results table.
Land elevation matters significantly for migration. In the study, farmers told surveyors
whether they considered their main or secondary plot was of “high, medium, or low” elevation.
Only 242 of 1025 farmers reported having a plot of “low” elevation, and only 14% of total
primary and secondary plots had this designation. Having at least one agricultural plot of “low”
elevation increases the likelihood of migration by 5% (Table 3). Does this suggest perceived
environmental insecurity is a factor for outmigration? Do more vulnerable farmers tend to
migrate? Which, if any, climate-related environmental pressures are correlated to migration? The
vulnerability of lowlanders validates our upcoming examination of environmental risk
perceptions as migration drivers (Section 4.2).
Our last of the base factors, food insecurity (forgoing food or limiting the size of meals
within the past year) shows a significant positive coefficient (0.3, p < 0.05) increasing likelihood
of migration by 8% (Tables 2 and 3). Indeed, then, whether a family experienced seasonal
hunger in the prior year correlates persistently with migration across all models. This coincides
with findings from an upriver, drought-prone district (Rajshahi) that monga is a perennial
migration driver in the marginal lands of Bangladesh (Farhana & Mannan, 2018). Mondal &
Yadav lay blame on the agricultural system within the polderlands: adverse inundation in our
study area during the typically fecund monsoon burdens farmers with a once-yearly cropping
system occurring only during the lower yielding dry season (Yadav et al., 2020).
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The persistent effect of food shortage throughout our regression model series indicates
the salience of poverty-driven migration from our study area. Food shortage suggests persistent
gaps in staple crop productivity and inadequate environmental management of the complex
polderland hydrology. We turn therefore to investigate environmental disaster frequency and the
perception of crop loss from such challenges.
4.2. Investigating Environmental Drivers
In line with what the literature identifies, we predicted that soil salinity, drought, and
insect infestation (long-term climate shocks) would induce migration, while flooding (a shortterm shock) would inhibit it.
In our data, for every year of the past five that a farm experienced flooding, migration
decreases by 4% (p < 0.05). Counterintuitively, this is in line with the literature’s conclusion that
floods, a short-term shock, tie down populations in rebuilding and re-cultivating the land (J. J.
Chen et al., 2017).
Neither the frequencies of drought nor insect attack were significant migration drivers.
Farmers may “factor in” these adverse events to life working in agriculture on the polders (Gray
& Mueller, 2012).
However, those who perceived salinity’s effects on their crops were 8% more likely to
migrate (p < 0.1). This relationship suggests that even if the spatial impact of salinity is limited
(only 9% of respondents said they had lost crops due to salinity), the perceptible magnitude of
salinity’s destructive effects on crop yield is a determinative factor of migration.
When added to the base model, we notice that environmental drivers (lowland, flood
frequency and loss to salinity) largely supplant the significance of socio-economic factors.
Lowland cultivation assumes a highly significant marginal effect of 13% to migration (p < 0.001,
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Table 3, column 2), again highlighting the risk-dependent channel of migration from our area.
This endorses our vulnerability-dependent emigration hypotheses, that climate effects are
undercutting choice-driven channels.
Exposure is one side of climate vulnerability. The other component is resilience. We turn
now to social and physical infrastructure; the chief component of resilience.
4.3. Investigating Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
Perception of infrastructure vulnerabilities may be a migration driver. The perception of
threat—and the perception of the community’s own lack of resilience—is a possible emigration
driver for those with enough economic capacity to leave. Our source survey comprehensively
evaluated perceptions of infrastructure health and inclusive decision-making within the study
area, offering us an opportunity to judge the effectiveness of rural development collectives in
influencing outmigration.
Water Management Groups (WMG) within the polder lands such as the Dutch-funded
Blue Gold initiative are local hydraulic infrastructure management groups within Bangladesh
designed to collectively govern and maintain the polder ecosystem’s crucial system of irrigation
and embankments. Having a household member belonging to a WMG is highly significant for
migration (p > 0.01) with a marginal effect of 11% (Table 2 and 3). Perhaps WMGs function
poorly and push members to emigrate, seeking some effective economic agency for themselves.
Perhaps WMGs function so well, in strengthening the agricultural value chain, that they increase
household incomes enough to fund outmigration. However, data analysis shows that mean
annual incomes between WMG member families matched non-WMG families ($840 USD),
undercutting any vast wealth differences between members and non-members.
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We test infrastructure and WMG group effectiveness perceptions broadly against
migration and find no evidence of poor group functioning. Only poor canal conditions influence
migration (decreasing migration by 7%; p < 0.01, Table 3, column 3). In our study area, this
answers a criticism Thomas has of Blue Gold and associated development projects in coastal
Bangladesh that they enrich absentee aquaculture practitioners while forcing local farmers off the
land through salinification (Thomas, 2020). In the study area, neither sluice gate operation nor
other governance metrics have any significant impact on migration. This suggests that WMG
governance functions inclusively.
Poor canals do point to the salience of flooding infrastructure within our study area
(presumably tying down populations due to post-flood rebuilding). Canals, or khals, are natural
watercourses through the polders. When they are infrequently excavated and left dry (poorly
maintained, in other words), they shunt the seasonally fertile upstream sediment into rivers
outside the polder, raising the river’s bottom through deposition while the in-polder land sinks
lower (termed waterlogging). Eventually, the river outside the polder overtops the land inside
due to tidal or storm forces. Thus, poorly maintained canals raise the risk of catastrophic
flooding (Mahmood & Saleh, 2020; Mainuddin et al., 2021; Yadav et al., 2020).
Since flooding reduces economic capacity to send migrants, we need to explore economic
effects on migration. We turn therefore to our results on income amounts and sources to further
discern if wealth predicts migration (characterizing a planned, pull-dominant migration flow) or,
conversely, if migrants are themselves impoverished (an unplanned, push-dominant flow).
4.4. Investigating Income Amounts and Sources
We intended to uncover the character of emigration from the study area, either planned or
unplanned. To do so, we hypothesized that greater income enabled greater emigration. We
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presumed that having urban-oriented, non-agriculture income sources predisposed migration
(“brain drain”). In turn, we expected to find that wealthier households send more migrants.
We instead find that higher annual income (and whether it derives from non-agricultural
sources) has no impact on migration. Instead, we see that having more men working in
agriculture increases migration by 6% (p < 0.01), a characteristic of poverty/overpopulation as a
driver. Agricultural migrants do not fetch high incomes in our study area. More mouths to feed
increase the subsistence burden. The only significant non-agricultural wealth sources we test
have an ambivalent effect on migration, with pension/salary driving outmigration by 12%
(p < 0.001 in column 4 of table 3), and trade income hindering migration by 7% (p < 0.01 in
column 4).
We measured whether a household member receives a salary/pension in our study. This
source of income may provide the income stability to fund urban-oriented migration with
younger members of the extended family. 16% of our study households drew on salary/pension
income (169/1025), of whom only 28% sent a migrant. This suggests the opportunity channel for
migration is out of reach of most polderland households.
Similarly, trade or business income was limited to 167 households (16%), inaccessible to
most. Few households derive wealth from salary/pension or business/merchant activity and thus
they are insignificant for a majority of migrant-sending households. Our survey was limited in
explaining the exact nature of business as a matter of course, but we can assume trade income’s
anticorrelation with migration indicates that profits do not fund emigration. Likely, the amounts
are reinvested in business: perhaps the livelihood is generally not stable enough to invest in
outside opportunities.
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Definitively, emigration from our study area is strongly governed by hydrological threat,
lack of savings, food insecurity, and a struggling flood control infrastructure.
5. Limitations and Weaknesses
Our pooled model has an R-squared of 22% and loses some observations in the final
pooled model due to non-response bias (from 1025 to 391). One of the larger drops in
observations is between Base and Climate Perception series presumably because a non-response
is a culturally acceptable way to indicate a negative response. It would be possible to impute
values on five-year environmental impact frequencies but doing so may fail to capture the
intense variation of flooding/salinity within the complex riverine study area. Salinity studies of
individual polders prove the intense geophysical variations within them, necessitating the use of
ground truthing over household survey response data to capture it precisely (Akter et al., 2020;
Assefa et al., 2021). To impute missing data is to disregard the risk perception and agency of the
human actors in migration themselves. What may be best would be to re-survey the study polders
as Emran et al. did with coast-facing polders in 2005 and 2015 in order to assess the trajectory of
poverty and environmental risk perception statistics (Emran et al., 2021).
6. Conclusions
In our analysis, migration from the polderland conforms heavily to the catastrophic
climatic response channel of outmigration. Not only are higher wealth markers indeterminate for
migration, but cyclical food shortage, low-lying land, and long-term, irreversible climatic shocks
(chiefly saline intrusion) have a heavy influence in outmigration. The persistent anticorrelation
of flooding frequency and its proxies imply that what little resources respondents have is used in
rebuilding a frequently inundated coastal zone, suggesting that the most vulnerable of the
polderland farmers subsist within a trapped population that cannot afford to migrate, although
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migration and off-farm income has often been found to be the principal way for polder farmers in
Bangladesh to afford agricultural adaptation investments (Emran et al., 2021). In other polders
closer to the sea such as Morrelganj, salinity is already contaminating the population’s drinking
water. Locals demand raising the embankments (Charles, 2021), but doing so may encourage the
land inside to sink and degrade due to lack of sediment (Cornwall, 2018). NGO involvement in
the study area will be key to mediating demands of locals with broader findings and tailoring
informed requests for government intervention with the two key goals of 1) lowering barriers to
off-farm employment for household members to stabilize incomes and 2) using those incomes to
increase agriculture intensity on the polder lands for food security (Assefa et al., 2021; Shew et
al., 2019, 2021).
After conducting the 2016 survey on which our analysis is based, IRRI and IWMI
undertook extensive experimentation, within Polder-30, to strengthen hydraulic management
practices to enable short-grain High Yield Variety (HYV) rice to be grown with a new yearround cropping system (Yadav et al., 2020). Shew et al. model how the rice import gap (which
costs Bangladesh billions annually) can be effectively bridged by strengthening this dual regime
of better rice and more efficient drainage (Shew et al., 2019). Our analysis concurs, noting that
eliminating food shortage, strengthening freshwater retention, and raising agricultural
productivity will enable more efficient allocation of labor to the land, allowing this vulnerable
part of Bangladesh to close the gap in food security and stem the catastrophic loss of a way of
life for millions.
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Chapter 3: Religion as Migration Selector
In the above regression series, household religion emerged as the most persistent, most
significant factor for outmigration. A deeper look into the inequal migration rates between Hindu
and Muslim households is therefore not only warranted but compelled by the prominence of the
issue.
Khulna district is a demographic anomaly within Bangladesh. The only Hindu-majority
district in East Pakistan at the time of Partition (Chatterji, 1999), Khulna continues to host a large
Hindu minority within present-day Bangladesh. Eighty-three percent of the households in our
three-polder study area within Khulna are Hindu. Yet, belonging to the 17% Muslim population
is one of the strongest predictors of migration in our regression series. Why?
In a study area more than 80% Hindu, being Muslim made it far more likely that a
household would migrate, with a marginal effect of 15% (p < 0.01). Being Hindu had no
significant influence on migration. Such a high associated likelihood of migration for a Muslim
household raises important questions about differences in risk perception, environmental
response, equity, and opportunity between the two communities.
To what extent can we interpret the difference of migration decision as religiously
inspired or motivated? Let us assume within our study area that two neighbors with two different
religions do not radically differ in their perception of the risks of climate change, nor do they
adopt wildly different, religiously systemized behaviors to risk. Let us, instead, assume that the
main function of religious identification in our study area is as a mere social marker of societal
affiliation. This broader affiliation of religion with the body politic in South Asia has geohistorical logic due to the Partition of British India along lines of overt religious adherence
(Chatterji, 1999). If we assume similar migration risk calculi, nevertheless, it is possible the two
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communities have very different balances of constraints and resources. Treating the two
communities as separate entities for migration analysis suggests two contradictory possibilities:
1) Muslims (the minority in the polders) are ghettoized into areas of increased environmental
risk, or 2) both populations are equally exposed, but Hindus (the minority within Bangladesh)
lack the social networks of their Muslim neighbors.
This section builds on the UK’s 2011 Foresight report articulating a definition of trapped
populations as those in a downward earning spiral due to increasing environmental pressure,
increasingly unable to emigrate in a secure, planned way due to depleted household capital
(Black, Adger, et al., 2011a).
Premise 1: Muslim Spatial Segregation
The first premise to test is that the Muslim community is suffering a disproportionate
environmental impact within our study area due to spatial segregation from the Hindu majority.
An underlying explanation would be, perhaps, that Muslims were late settlers to a largely Hindu
area and stayed on the cheapest, most marginal, most exposed land (Chatterji, J., 2007). If this
explanation were plausible, we should see among Muslims: a) lower markers of land ownership
and a higher sharecropping percentage, b) a higher ownership of lowland plots, and c) elevated
environmental risk perception scores. All of these elements paint the picture of populations
aware that they are living on worse, more exposed, land.
Premise 2: Lack of Social Capital for Hindus
Our second premise is a variation on the first. In this explanation, the real difference in
land quality and environmental risk between the two communities is minimal and both
communities farm equally poor land. Instead, this premise states, Muslims have an “escape
hatch” that Hindus do not: more relatives and social communities ready to assist them in making
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a move elsewhere (Ravi, 2021). Politically, this premise fits the Indian Government logic—in
granting citizenship in 2019 to Bangladeshi Hindu migrants only—that Hindus are an oppressed
minority within Bangladesh and deserve preferential treatment. The author is skeptical, but
willing to test the premise (R. Ahmed, 2018).
If this explanation is true, we should see a difference in the nature of migration: Muslims
should be relocating disproportionately on a permanent basis, while Hindus should be “trapped”
locally, opting to work seasonally (Black et al., 2011; Mursheda & Abdul, 2018). In addition, I
suggest that we should see lower educational barriers to migration among Muslims, e.g. Muslims
requiring less education to migrate (and therefore Muslim migrants with less average education)
as a function of possessing more social capital in other urban centers within Bangladesh (less job
discrimination, ease of access to informal networks such as mosques and extended family
businesses) which effectively compensates for any lack of educational certificate.
Descriptive Data
Below is a table showing the significant socio-economic differences in the population of
Hindus and Muslims in our three-polder study area. From Chapter One, we select the following
factors key migration drivers: a) household is Muslim, b) family lives on a lowland plot, c) more
frequent flooding (anti-correlated with migration), and d) percentage of crop was lost to soil
salinization within past five years.
Along with the migration drivers previously studied, we added additional environmental
risk factors (ones suggesting poor land quality), indicators for asset ownership, migrant
education and destination, and family size (suggesting greater social network potential). The
bolded religious community indicates the higher proportion of response in that category, with the
difference in percent between Hindus and Muslims for each category noted on the far right, for
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simplicity’s sake.
Table 1 – Religious Community Differentials
Variable
Religion
Migration (one or more
family member has
migrated)
Environmental Risk
Factors
Sharecropping

Religion
Hinduism
Islam
Hindu
Muslim

Hindu
Muslim
Lack ownership papers
Hindu
Muslim
Farms a Lowland plot
Hindu
Muslim
Frequent Flooding
Hindu
(>median of 2x in 5 yrs)
Muslim
Recorded Salinity Crop
Hindu
Loss in past 5 years (>0%) Muslim
Frequent Insect Outbreaks Hindu
Muslim
Frequent Drought
Hindu
Muslim
Social Capital Factors
Below Mean Per Capita
Hindu
Income
Muslim
Larger Families (>5, the
Hindu
mean)
Muslim
Above average farm size
Hindu
( >1 acre)
Muslim
Migrant Education
High School
Hindu
Muslim
University
Hindu
Muslim
Type of Migration
Permanent
migration
Hindu
Muslim
Seasonal migration

Frequency of Response
844
82.7 %
176
17.3 %
118
14.0 %
47
26.7 %

% Difference
65.4
12.7

225
108
96
57
189
53
296
62
233
77
272
69
218
58

26.7 %
61.4 %
11.4 %
34.1 %
22.0 %
30.0 %
35.0 %
35.2 %
27.6 %
43.8 %
32.2 %
39.2 %
25.8 %
33.0 %

262

31.0 %

50
340

28.4 %
40.3 %

78
386
94

44.3 %
45.7 %
53.4 %

4.0

21
1
24
3

17.8 %
2.1 %
20.3 %
6.4 %

15.7

76
18

64.4 %
38.3 %

26.1

34.7
22.7
8.0
0.2
16.2
7.0
7.2
2.6

7.7

13.9
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Migration Abroad

Hindu
Muslim
Hindu
Muslim

42
29
13
5

35.6 %
61.7 %
11.0 %
10.6 %

26.1
0.4

Discussion
Our first premise states that Muslims are far likelier to migrate due to the poor,
environmentally at-risk land they inhabit. Is this plausible? Circumstantially, yes: Muslims are
substantially poorer materially than their Hindu neighbors: 35% likelier to sharecrop, 23%
likelier to lack ownership papers, and 8% likelier to farm low elevation land (Table 1). In return
for inhabiting more marginal land, Muslims were 16% likelier to perceive a degree of saline crop
destruction—the chief environmental migration driver from Bangladesh previously noted not just
in our prior chapter but by numerous studies (J. J. Chen et al., 2017; J. Chen & Mueller, 2018;
Gray & Mueller, 2012), 7% likelier to experience frequent insect or plant disease outbreak, 7%
likelier to have frequent drought incidence. There is evidence the worse land reduces ability to
educate children too: only 6% of high school or tertiary-educated household heads were Muslim,
and only 7% of high school and university-educated migrants were, significantly less than their
proportion of the population (17%). Muslim respondents in our study area are not accessing
education, a key input for greater income. It seems plausible that, as elsewhere in Bangladesh,
debts incurred by tenancy and recurrent environmental disasters may require the family to
employ child labor on the fields instead of sending them to school (Mursheda & Abdul, 2018).
Our competing premise states that Muslims are nevertheless advantaged due to greater
social networks and concomitantly experience lower barriers to migration. Does this bear out?
Instead of Hindus relocating seasonally—according to prediction—Hindu migrants prefer to
settle permanently in a new location. However, they are moving with greater educational status.
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This could tell us several things: 1) Hindu migrants require better base education to obtain jobs
elsewhere, 2) Hindu families have greater opportunities to educate their children, apart from
forcing them to work through childhood. I cannot prove the first claim without conducting focus
groups; I can prove the second by looking at educational outcomes and concomitant
opportunities obtained from them.
As discussed, Hindu migrants are far likelier to possess secondary and tertiary education
diplomas compared to Muslims. This indicates that the choice and opportunity channel of
migration—not the catastrophic migration channel—is preferred by Hindus in our study area
(Kaczan & Orgill-Meyer, 2020). The data show that Hindus are able to obtain higher education
disproportionate to their numbers, despite similar incomes to their Muslim neighbors. The
destination for these migrants is likely to be Dhaka or a nearby in-country urban center: only 18
migrants out of 165 headed abroad, and the rate of migration abroad was not significantly
different by religion. Note that Muslims had a 12.7% higher propensity to migrate than Hindus.
However, note that Muslims prefer seasonal migration over permanent migration by 26%. These
migrants are predominantly not high school educated, and we can assume their seasonal work
does not earn high enough, stable income to enable permanent resettlement.
Research Limitations
I am limited by the sample size’s ability to represent the whole in polders 28/1, 28/2, and
30. Farmers who chose to speak to IRRI/IWMI representatives were those whose responses were
recorded. Without speaking to those who conducted the survey, we cannot disclaim a response
bias of the better-educated. At the time of publication, the author could not match a national
census on the question of religion at the granular level of our study area to determine the
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religious representativeness of our sample. The 2016 data stands as the most comprehensive
demographic glimpse to date within the study area.
Conclusion and Research Implications
The disparities in our study area are not primarily income and asset based. Instead, the
disparities appear to center on educational inputs and migration outcomes.
We see, clearly, that Muslims are far likelier to migrate, but far likelier to do so
seasonally instead of permanently. Muslims’ educational levels and land ownership status appear
to pin them down to land which appears to be riskier in the face of hostile climate pressures.
Muslims in our study area appear to be the “trapped population,” not Hindus, who tend to plan
and choose migration in such a way that household income stability is the likely outcome.
Further research could test the interactivity of religion with environment and agriculturebased job migration within the region in a regression series. Doing so could cast more light on
the rural, unskilled nature of minority-Muslim migration from the polder area.
Gaining a true glimpse into the inequities of opportunity within climatically at-risk
migrant hotspots enables us to see, as I argue in further chapters, that environmental risk
introduces potential cleavages along the very fault lines of society’s organization. When
inequalities of ethnoreligious nature are baked into the system, climate migration and conflict
exacerbate these societal cleavages.
As Yuval Noah Harari writes in 2015’s Homo Deus, “There are no longer natural famines
in the world; there are only political famines.” The increasing constitution of nationality by
religion within South Asia, and the increasing territorialization of religious identity not only
exacerbates the political consequences of environmental mass migration which the Groundswell
Report predicts to occur ever more frequently, but also sets the stage for migrant demonization,
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demagoguery, and potential ethnic cleansing on an unfathomable scale proportional to the
incredibly dense populations of South Asia (R. Ahmed, 2014; Oza, 2007; Slater & Masih, 2019).
Waldo Tobler once stated a fundamental law of geography: “everything is related to
everything else, but near things are more related to distant things” (Tobler, 2004, 305).
Emigration from Bangladesh most prominently affects its neighbor in India, with which it shares
a common past. The next chapter will treat the border regions of India and their acceptance or
pushback of migrants as a knock-on effect of climate migration. Assam and West Bengal states
are respectively illustrative of the two socio-political choices facing societies in climate
migration destination areas (whether to fight or to receive migrants). Tobler’s second law, after
all, is “the phenomenon external to an area of interest affects what goes on inside” (ibid., 308).
Climate is the external driver increasingly affecting migration and conflict on a macro scale. Let
us turn now to see it at work in India.
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Chapter 4: India, Bangladesh, and Host-Migrant Proximities
Chapter Summary
As we have seen, climate migration from our study area in coastal Bangladesh is seldom
associated with moves abroad. Nevertheless, religious affiliation remains a significant factor in
migration. It is the religious hue of migration which entangles it by international geopolitics in
South Asia, and the fear of mass migration by Muslim Bangladeshis is an instrument that the
Hindu supremacist ruling party of India utilizes for mobilizing nativist, religious voters, reconceptualizing Indian citizenship as belonging foremost to Hindus (R. Ahmed, 2014; Oza,
2007; Saikia, 2020).
The study of climate mobility increasingly highlights the unexamined role of receiving,
not just sending, areas (Cundill et al., 2021). India’s border regions alongside Bangladesh exhibit
vastly different responses in the political sphere to mass migration. Assam has witnessed intense
spasms of nativist violence against migrants; by contrast, the state of West Bengal has rarely
seen communal violence at all.
I use the findings of Lujala’s 2020 Bengal region Focus Group Discussion (FGD) studies
of local attitudes toward Bangladeshi migrants to articulate three major psycho-social factors that
seem to govern the quality of local political receptions toward environmental migrants: 1)
ethnoreligious proximity, 2) socioeconomic proximity, and 3) common perception of spatial
proximity to shared risk. The rubric of proximities is a constructive tool to explain ongoing
refugee flows from countries as varied as Ukraine and Syria, laying groundwork for predicting
the political impact of future climate migration flows.
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Introduction: A Tale of Two Migrations
On February 24th, 2022, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine. Almost immediately,
Europe stepped in. Romanians, Moldovans, and Poles opened their homes to millions of
refugees. Legal barriers to indefinite stay were relaxed, visas were eliminated, businesses
advertised open positions for Ukrainians only, the world’s wealthy countries organized relief
shipments, and neighboring governments’ militaries took immediate, prominent roles
accommodating transport to ease increased migration flows (Alderman & Cohen, 2022; StanleyBecker et al., 2022).
In July 2011, Syria descended into civil war. Refugees from the country took to the
Mediterranean to reach Europe, and Europe arrested waves of migrants upon the waters. Legal
barriers to indefinite stay were erected, and many countries along the migrant path built higher
walls and strengthened border forces (Jones & Johnson, 2016). Mediterranean EU countries
criminalized migrant-rescue NGOs, embarking on progressively stringent legislation designed to
send the message: you will never have a future here (Palmer, 2022).
Why these two different responses?
In 1970, the deadliest cyclone in recorded history struck the country of Bangladesh,
followed by mass anti-government protests, a genocide, and a civil war. West Bengal hosted
three million Bangladeshis, built social networks, granted government assistance, facilitated
citizen volunteer help, and over the years, granted many arrivals citizenship. Politicians evinced
widespread sympathy towards their eastern “cousins” of the Bengali culture (Ravi, 2021).
The same storm pushed migrants north into Assam. Resentment took hold at the
uncounted millions of “foreigners” settling permanently on the land. In the 1980s, student
militants violently pressed the government to identify and expel the “plague” of “infiltrators,”
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securing Indian Government laws promising to bar citizenship for civil war arrivals (Borah,
2019). In the 2010s, the Hindu nationalist government used the nativist demands as a launchpad
to conduct a pilot citizen registry (NCR), identifying “doubtful” citizens on the voting roles and
requiring them to produce sufficient documentation of legal residence; many individuals, lacking
sufficient documents despite long histories in the region, took their own lives (R. Ahmed, 2018;
Vaidyanathan, 2019). The objective of the government was to deport undocumented, non-Hindu,
Muslim Bengali speakers. Mass deportation camps continue to be built along the border at the
time of writing, and “foreigner’s tribunals” increasingly issue summary deportations (R. Ahmed,
2014).
Why these two different responses?
War is a very powerful trigger for unplanned mass migration. Rarely are nations prepared
to receive such numbers when it occurs. Yet, host societies and their governments act upon a
choice, mobilizing resources to either receive migrants or repel them. Increasingly, climate
migration science examines host societies, not simply sending areas, in order to forecast and
mitigate future conflicts (Cundill et al., 2021). Although it is a general wisdom that successful
migrant outcomes depend upon a positive host community reception, scant research has been
conducted until recently into the factors that influence migrant reception.
Through analysis of 2020 focus group discussion (FGD) research within Southwest
Bangladesh, Lujala and his co-authors identify three salient categories of shared “proximities”
which seem to govern migrant reception within a new community: a) ethnoreligious proximity,
b) socioeconomic proximity, and c) social perception of similarly shared risk (Lujala et al.,
2020). By applying this rubric to the differential reception of Bangladeshi migration into West
Bengal and Assam, and by articulating the different politico-social role granted Bengali Muslims
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within both Indian states by the historic logics of Indian geopolitics at the time of Partition, we
validate the three-factor rubric and seek to apply it to emerging migration waves in the present
day.
Lujala’s Proximity Framework: Ethnoreligious, Socioeconomic, Environmental Risk
Lujala et al. sought to fill the gap in research among host communities receiving climate
migrants by conducting regressional analysis of focus group responses from 630 residents of
Satkhira district, Southwest Bangladesh, along the eastern border if India’s West Bengal state
(Lujala et al., 2020). The authors tested factors of spatial, attitudinal, experiential, and social
proximity among host community participants, calculating the predictive regression for pro- or
anti-immigrant sentiments.
Spatial proximity to shared risk mattered: the greater the perception that both the host
community and migrant community were at risk from similar forces of climate change, the
likelier they were to advocate receiving migrants. Lujala posits that not only greater empathy, but
also more realistic appraisal of risks, arises from greater spatial proximity to environmental
emigration drivers (ibid.).
Attitudinal and experiential proximity of host-migrant communities also mattered: “those
who see people more as makers of their own fate or hold people highly accountable for their
actions tend to be more skeptical toward climate migrants while those with higher levels of
social trust [of migrants] are more welcoming” (9). The authors write that having experienced
traumatic climate migration made respondents additionally more likely to welcome others;
experience molds worldview even as the background religious belief in “fate” works to “blame”
other forces than the forced migrant for their situation.
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Finally, social proximity has a major impact on host-community reception. The closer
that migrants were in economic or caste status to respondents, the likelier host communities were
to receive them, with “attitudes becoming more negative as socio-economic or class differences
increase” (10). The authors also saw scant evidence of the conventional explanation, the labor
market competition theory, in play among the working or less-educated poor. Those with more
stable, higher-earning incomes often live on higher land and are exposed to less hazard, seeming
to decrease their empathetic capacities as they lack shared intensity of risk perception (8-9).
Importantly, goodwill among the poor has limits, however: “having extended family members
living in highly exposed areas was related to more negative views,” as “people in the studied
region tend to rely on their extended family when migrating,” supporting the evidence that those
already burdened were “wary of being stuck with the responsibility of helping their extended
family members while also at the same time being asked to accommodate non-family migrants in
their community” (10). Even in empathetic, highly proximal locations within Bangladesh, hosts
were inclined to perceive capacity boundaries if they were already hosting family.
Lujala et al.’s study demonstrates that environmental risk perceptions permeate all
dimensions of psycho-social migrant-host proximities in climate impacted communities such as
southwest Bangladesh. We can group these findings into three categories. Ethnoreligious
proximity explains common worldviews and languages. Socioeconomic proximity characterizes
common caste, kinship ties, or economic status. And shared risk perception characterizes the
spatial proximity element of common negative environmental emigration pressures.
A separate study confirmed the external validity of these conclusions with a similar study
among West Bengal focus groups. Shared ethnoreligious, socioeconomic, and environmental risk
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proximities explain the sociopolitical welcome Bangladeshi migrants have received in West
Bengal.
West Bengal: A United History
Host-migrant ethnoreligious proximity was a hallmark of 2017 focus group interviews
conducted in West Bengal (Shamshad, 2017). Often, this emerged from the historical unity of
Bengal, both West (in India, Calcutta-side) and East (what became the country of Bangladesh).
The sources interviewed persistently referenced a shared pre-Partition history, a touchpoint
seemingly formative of a common Bengali identity.
The British partition of 1905 United Bengal into Muslim and Hindu sides, done
ostensibly to quash the ferment of Indian self-rule coming from the universities of Calcutta—
whose massive protests contributed to the British desperation to shift all state functions out of
Bengal in 1911 to a baroque, planned city they termed New Delhi—failed upon the reunification
of the region (Chatterji, 2007). This initial failure to split Bengal seemed to presage a popular
unity that downgraded religious differences for a unified front against the central government
(Chatterji, 1999; Shamshad, 2017). This ethnic unity, despite divergent dialects and differing
religious majorities, established a common homeland in the popular poems and songs of the
early 1900s Bengali renaissance’s “Golden Bengal” (Jones, 2012). Interviewees frequently
referenced the geography of the Ganges Delta providing a fixed and historical ethnic definition
transcending state boundaries or religious divisions (Jones, 2009). The memory of historical
unity partly transcended religious divisions during the Partition of India. During Partition talks
between the Congress, the Muslim League, and the British commission, India maneuvered to
keep the northwestern, majority-Muslim districts of Malda and Murshidabad in order to maintain
control of the Ganges headwaters (Chatterji, 1999). In so doing, they began a political
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partnership with local Muslim elites in these areas which has persisted through seven decades of
secular, not religious, coalition rule (Chatterji, 2007). Secular, broad-based, Muslim-inclusive
ruling coalitions have been the norm within Indian Bengal, presenting a base of regional
resistance against the central government’s imposition of a Hindu criterium for Indian citizenship
(Saikia, 2020). This again echoes the historical-political unity of Bengal.
Ethnoreligious identity is the most atavistic and seemingly immutable component of
modern national identity. The unity of ethnic belonging among Bengalis seems to override
religious identification despite the years of mass migration from Bangladesh. Shamshad claims,
despite the unreckoned numbers of undocumented Bangladeshis in West Bengal, “By 1973 [after
the 1971 genocide and Liberation war within Bangladesh], almost 15% of West Bengal’s entire
population, and one in four [urban dwellers] were of East Bengali [Bangladeshi] origin…Today,
one in every three people in West Bengal is of East Bengali origin” (Shamshad, 2017).
Socioeconomic proximity in West Bengal is also close between migrants and hosts.
Shamshad’s interviewees note intermarriage and kinship ties between the two, and with mutual
social ties, there are also economic connections. Demand for immigrant labor is strong
(Shamshad, 2017). The distinction locals in West Bengal make is merely between Bengal “on
this side” (e-par) and Bengal “on that side” (o-par), a matter of preferring fish to prawns and one
sports team to another (439-40). Common social ties and a common economic status provide
social networks for new migrants and reduce barriers to migration (Bonfanti, 2014; Mursheda &
Abdul, 2018; Lujala et al., 2020).
Perceptions of shared risk also join host-migrant communities in West Bengal. Spatial
proximity ensures that environmental disasters such as May 2020’s Super Cyclone “Amphan”—
the strongest recorded storm ever to form in the Bay of Bengal—impact not only Bangladesh,
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but also the entire state of West Bengal (Rajaram et al., 2020), influencing a shared framework
of risk perceptions. Environmental risk perceptions among West Bengalis are high, and climate
change attribution for degrading farmland is highly prevalent (Adger et al., 2021), undergirding
widespread sympathy for forced environmental migrants. In addition to environmental risk,
political analysts have noted a shared perception of risk of Hindi hegemony with the ruling
power attempting to enforce linguistic and religious unity through a program of Hindutva (Hindu
identity as political criteria for citizenship) (Oza, 2007; Saikia, 2020). Sympathy towards those
targeted by the ruling regime is a factor in receiving Bangladeshi migrants. In practice, both
Bangladesh and West Bengal tend to aver, officially as a matter of course, that apprehended
undocumented migrants, slated to be deported, are simply native West Bengalis, and it is not
uncommon for new arrivals to simply change their Muslim names to neutral or Hindu ones in
order to evade suspicion (Das & Ansary, 2018; Jones, 2012; Shamshad, 2017; Tripathi, 2016).
The ability of the undocumented to obtain Indian Aadhar cards (biometrically-linked
government assistance cards) would not be possible without widespread institutional sympathy
and civil society assistance (Chakraborty, 2018; Das & Ansary, 2018).
Assam: A Divergent Host-Migrant History
Assam, a region on Bangladesh’s north, demonstrates the opposite attitude to
Bangladeshi migrants. The ethnoreligious proximity is not close, and in fact, has been diverging
since its common history under British colonization—due to the divisions introduced by the
British in its colonial enterprise (R. Ahmed, 2014).
Gupta traces the turn of local public opinion against Bengali migrants in Assam.
Assamese natives, themselves, are a multi-ethnic people descending from the Ahom, a Taispeaking people related to the Shan of northwest Burma, intermarrying with indigenous Tibetans
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in the Brahmaputra River Valley and incorporating many migrant Indian populations (Borah,
2019). Prior to British control, wars between the Tibetans and the ruling Assamese had
devastated the rural population along the lowlands (Gupta, 2018). In the 1890s, the British
embarked on a nascent tea industry in Assam, but the enterprise lacked a workforce. The Assam
were land-rich but labor-poor, well into the 1930s (Gupta, 2001). With centuries of facility in
riverine agriculture, demanding relatively low wages, Muslim Bengalis coming from the
overcrowded delta were welcomed by local elites as a laboring class essential to develop a cash
economy based on tea export (ibid). Over time, migration from not just Bengal but also central
India formed a Hindi pidgin language, a mixed regional identity, both termed Asami (Borah,
2019). Assamese language developed into its own dialect and political entity in late British rule.
When India gained independence, Bengali laborers became a great source of political
power for the Assamese: during the first census just after independence, Bengali workers
followed the Muslim League’s insistence and identified as “Asamiya” (Gupta, 2018). In this way,
Gupta writes,
“One, for the first time, the Asamiya speakers became an absolute majority within Assam.
This majority status was further consolidated in subsequent decades... through the
enactment of the Official Languages Act, 1960, making Asamiya the sole official
language of the state...Two, the electoral support of the Muslim settlers provided Asamiya
leaders with a safe route to political power, which was essential for the retention and
expansion of Asamiya hegemony over Assam’s diverse peoples. Three, this marriage of
convenience with the migrant Muslims served as a counterweight against the powerful
Hindu Bengalis of Assam, who, after Partition, became a minority in the reconstituted
state” (Gupta, 2018).
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The rivalry with Hindu Bengalis, Gupta elsewhere notes, was due to job competition in
the middle class and government service sectors (Gupta, 2001). It was preferable for the
Assamese to partner with economically and politically weaker Muslim Bengalis, at least, as we
will see in the next section, until those individuals began to gain status and political voice
themselves.
The overcount of Asami citizens in the bedrock 1951 census lent the illusory conviction
that later mass migrations of Bangladeshis had overwhelmed native Assamese speakers (Gupta,
2018). During British rule, land-rich Assamese native elites held an unequal partnership with the
land-poor Muslim Bengali migrants against competing Hindu elites. This erstwhile partnership
was so strong that, after Partition, Assamese encouraged long-time Bengali farmers to be termed
“New Assamese” (Gupta, 2001) and assimilate into the new ethnicity. Host-migrant
ethnoreligious proximity had a possibility of developing into a permeable state, much like in
West Bengal.
But this unequal partnership was unstable, intolerant of job competition in the middleclass realm. The partnership fell out in communal riots responding to the 1960 Official
Languages Act. The imposition of Assamese as a state language—despite the lack of facility in it
for the poorly educated Bengali laboring class, and despite only a minority of residents in Assam
speaking the language—and riots opposing the Assamese language mandate, began to encourage
the rise of a separate Bengali consciousness and voting power (Saikia, 2020). The boundaries
between Assamese and Bengali were defined by this attempted assertion of Assamese power in
the form of language. Host-migrant ethnoreligious proximity in Assam would diverge
henceforth, local politicians using gradually more derogatory names such as outsiders, Mians
(Muslim men), infiltrators, invaders, and finally, termites in response to Bengali Muslim
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population growth and voting power in the region (R. Ahmed, 2014, 2018; Das & Ansary, 2018;
Rajagopalan, 2018). This culminated in periodic and ongoing episodes of extreme communal
violence against Muslim Bengali migrants (Borah, 2019; Borkakoti, 2013; Special to The New
York Times, 1980).
Thus, ethnoreligious “bright lines” between local Assamese and immigrant Bangladeshis
are distinct, and as previously noted, socioeconomic distinctions are fueled by this distinction.
The primary dispute between host-migrant communities in Assam is an economic one: the
gradual encroachment on previously communally-held Assamese tribal land by immigrant
Bangladeshis (Borah, 2019; Borkakoti, 2013; Gupta, 2018). Intermarriage by Assamese
jeopardizes communal land rights, so it seldom occurs (TOI, 2020). When the host community
perceives immigrants as lower in economic status/potential and erects impermeable boundaries
to entry, it is far less likely to receive migrants facing climate distress, as is the case with Assam
and Bangladesh (Lujala et al., 2020). Cost barriers to migration can be prohibitive when social
networks in the receiving community are poorly integrated or impoverished (Adger et al., 2021).
Spatially distinct, Assamese and immigrant Bangladeshis experience environmental risk
differently. As previously noted, native Assamese were historically land-rich and labor-poor.
Having communally-held ancestral land entitles Assamese to more environmentally secure land
on higher elevations, while the Bengali population lives on highly exposed seasonal islands
(“char”) and bottomlands along the Brahmaputra river, land which Assamese ancestrally
considered uninhabitable (Gupta, 2001, 2018). The risk to upland tea gardens, where much of the
Assamese socioeconomic activity is located, is therefore different environmentally than the risk
to the lowland rice fields along the Brahmaputra, where the Bengali population is located (Black,
Adger, et al., 2011a; Gupta, 2001). Drought and flood risk may occur on concurrent years, but it
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is more likely that, facing different threats in different years, Assam is less likely to perceive a
“greater enemy” in climate change than on the mass influx of Bangladeshis. As a review of
climate conflict literature notes, “widespread disasters generate solidarity and cooperation,” but
disasters affecting groups unevenly, particularly those affecting “river-sharing dyads” such as the
Assamese and the Bengalis within the state, tend to “increase inter-group conflict” through
scarcity, demand, and relative deprivation (Koubi, 2019). Barnett and Adger (2007) agree that “it
is relative rather more than absolute poverty that seems to matter” in civil conflict generated by
unequal climate impact.
World Climate Migration and the Authoritarian Response
Climate change means the ominous shift toward a new normal: new average climates,
new climate extremes. But we are not yet arrived at the new normal; we are in motion, and all of
the planetary systems of agriculture and economics of the 20 th century are dragged along by the
new tilt of the gravitational sphere as it adjusts.
Strong consensus exists that climate and migration are increasingly tied together, acting
upon the “agricultural pathway,” the price signal of decreased agricultural productivity and food
shortage mentioned in chapter two (de Sherbinin, 2020). The World Bank’s Groundswell Report
describes climate models that drive natural-resource dependent populations away from droughtprone, coastal areas towards already-populated upland areas of intensive agriculture—and into
cities as well, competing for state assistance with locals in order to cope with their livelihoods’
mass dislocations (Rigaud et al., 2018). The UK government’s Foresight report agrees that
“climate change will not cause, but rather amplify existing demographic trends of migration to
urban areas” (Black, Bennett, et al., 2011, S10). Although Gray and Mueller disapprove of this
so-called “Neo-Malthusian narrative” of famine and want, they admit that there is broad proof, in
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absence of state intervention, that the environmentally triggered collapse of local risk-sharing
networks and the undermining of local opportunities for off-farm employment increase the
motivation to relocate farther away (even decreasing the opportunity cost for mass migration
across borders) (Gray & Mueller, 2012). Mass migration seems to take “increasingly perilous
journeys” being driven by a “concern about local safety and security along with a prevailing
hopelessness,” social dislocations caused by the climate’s new normal (de Sherbinin, 2020, 7).
For Bangladeshis crossing the border, like 15-year-old Felani Khatun, journeys across
India’s new border walls end in death. Crossing the fence with her father to visit the house of her
betrothed in West Bengal, Felani was killed by India’s Border Security Force, which escaped
penalty due to authorization of lethal force (Jones, 2016). Khatun’s life was only one of the more
than 1,000 taken in the last decade along the new border fence built by India to contain
“Bangladeshi infiltrators” (ibid.). Ultimately, whether the destination is hostile Assam or
hospitable West Bengal does not matter if migrants do not survive the journey.
Border militarization is arguably a re-articulation of state sovereignty contra mundi, a
purposeful blurring of distinctions between police and military force, and ultimately a political
act to make war against unauthorized migrants (Jones & Johnson, 2016). The authorization of
migrants depends upon their characterization by powerful state and civil society actors, views
governed by host-migrant proximities of ethnic, economic, and spatial risk. Conflict is not the
only possible outcome, but it is a logical outworking of mass migration. If mass migration is to
increase, conflict may as well.
The links between climate and conflict are tentative, but emerging. A 2019 review of the
literature describes the two pathways as direct competition over scarce resources (“greed versus
grievance”) or indirect via the price signal of staple foods as described in chapter two (Koubi,
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2019). The Syrian Civil War, arguably, was sparked by the government’s poor management of
water resources in the face of a multidecadal drought so severe as to transgress the boundaries of
natural variability (Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015), underscoring the importance of responsive
government in anticipating impacts of climate on food price stability. Freshwater scarcity
elevates the risk of violence within states, even if limited evidence shows that it drives war
(Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007). What already seems to be occurring due to climate change is the
exacerbation of political violence inside states along ethnoreligious lines and—most prominent
of all—against immigrants (Buhaug & von Uexkull, 2021; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014). As
climate change increases the numbers of transregional and transborder migrants, we may already
be witnessing democratic backsliding in response. Here I suggest there is a connection between
mass migration and the rise of nativist authoritarianism.
It is increasingly clear that climate change is triggering the political pressure points of
mass immigration in the present day, reenacting a form of political theater very familiar to the
foremost expert of 20th Century nativist authoritarianism, Hannah Arendt. Herself an émigré
from 1930s Germany, she writes in 1951’s The Origins of Totalitarianism how the popular
dream of upward economic mobility collapses in economic downturn, generating mass mistrust
towards ruling elites and the liberal concept of the state (Arendt, 1951). The prospering of
outside groups engenders native fears of domination by non-natives, spurring alienated citizens
toward nativist autocrats who can articulate “negative solidarity,” an animus against an internal
minority enemy, the embrace of new national mythologies which propose to organize the state to
exclude scapegoats—minorities, perhaps immigrants, newly dispossessed of national
membership—in order to confiscate their prosperity for transfer to “true” citizens (ibid.).
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Arendt may be describing a historical experience, but the echoes today are haunting.
After the Cold War, not only the barriers to capital investment fell but also the barriers to labor
migration; global migration occurred first among the very wealthy, then the highly skilled;
throughout the world, increasingly, however, unskilled migrants took advantage of new, cheaper,
transportation and international frameworks for labor migration. In tandem, the global
reorganization of industry “offshore” destroyed skilled jobs in much of the developed world in
many of the urban centers continuing to receive migrants. Banks collapsed due to unregulated
speculation, economic downturn and rising unemployment ensued, and for debtor countries
which could not conduct quantitative easing, national austerity yoked high unemployment to a
dissolving welfare system in order to repay debts from failed banks to elite foreign creditors who
gave little else in return. Suddenly, the rootless wealthy were the origin of the problem, and
perhaps they had intended to “replace” native jobs with cheaper ones overseas and pocket the
difference. Perhaps migrants had streamed in too readily to drive down the pay of “honest” jobs.
Native perception of demographic dilution and economic subordination to non-natives
was not foreseen, but it proceeded from these events. The perception of native demographic
threat plays an instrumental role in the emerging so-called global democratic recession. For an
example close to home, the University of Chicago conducted regression analysis on the
participants of the January 6th insurrection and found large decadal increases of non-majority
population in a home county to be highly predictive of riot participation (Pape, 2021). Notably,
the researchers found that most of those arrested professed belief in the “Great Replacement”
conspiracy theory: the elite’s intentional substitution of white labor for imported immigrants
(“The Face of American Insurrection: Understanding the Rioters Who Stormed the US Capitol
on January 6, 2021,” 2022).
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It is beyond my scope to examine the transformation of media messaging around
immigration and the heightened utilization of mass migration fears for the purposes of political
violence. But the United States is not an isolated case. Strongmen in locations as varied as
Hungary, Poland, Austria, Italy, India, and Turkey have cultured a fear of immigrants in order to
spur a rally around the flag effect, enacting prohibitive restrictions on migrants and in some cases
revoking their previously granted rights (R. Ahmed, 2014; Cagaptay, 2018; Iakhnis et al., 2018;
Mulder, 2021; Raj, 2020). The destination at the end of the train track is by no means foregone,
but the train is going somewhere. Hannah Arendt warns,
“Politically speaking, tribal nationalism always insists that its own people is surrounded
by “a world of enemies,” “one against all,” that a fundamental difference exists between
this people and all others. It claims its people to be unique, individual, incompatible with
all others, and denies theoretically the very possibility of a common mankind long before
it is used to destroy the humanity of man.” (Arendt, 1951, 227)
But the power of the state can be checked by a strong civil society (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2020). Either one can turn the country from an ultimate end in violence.
Conclusion
Ethnic, economic, and environmental risk proximities all anchor migrant reception in
India’s Assam and West Bengal. The same proximities will influence the welcome of climate
migrants worldwide. Whether state structural or vigilante violence confronts the increasing
number of cross-border climate migrants depends entirely upon the host perception of ethnic,
economic, and risk proximities. Several of these proximities are mutable.
In 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel famously marshalled her state to receive
millions of Syrian refugees with the single statement, “Wir schaffen das” (We shall manage this).
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State maneuvering can only withstand public opposition so long: her battle with the hard-right
nativist Alternativ für Deutschland would have ended in quick defeat in 2017 if civil society had
not also joined to support the welcome. The state can fund structures like job training and
housing; civil society must arise to lend the humanitarian workforce, the human warmth, the
open interactions which are necessary to pull a new language learner into the community.
Ethnoreligious proximities are relatively immutable and path dependent. The migration
of tomorrow relies on the success of the migrants of today. Socioeconomic possibilities for
migrants can change if the rungs of society’s ladder, such as labor demand, attainable quality
education and reasonably priced healthcare are available to new migrants. Ukrainians are being
hired into higher-education, higher-paid positions (Alderman & Cohen, 2022). Over the past
decade, Syrians successfully took many of the jobs in skilled trades underpinning Germany’s
export-led economy, jobs which relied on the official apprenticeship programs established by the
German state (Oltermann, 2020).
While the state can lead in easing migrant crises and structurally guiding migrants
towards extent labor shortages, only civil society can communicate a culture of shared
environmental risk. Churches, media, free associations, and volunteers can educate and influence
society to see the common potential fate of hosts and migrants if they do not structure a managed
response to the human effects of global warming on a mass scale. Responses must address the
increased vulnerabilities not only of urban constituencies but also entire rural infrastructures of
agriculture, and solutions must appropriately address the transnational nature of emerging
climate problems (Dalby, 2013).
Proximities are not so inalterable that perceptions cannot be changed. The geopolitics of
the Anthropocene, however, stands upon a knife edge of the demagogue: host-migrant distances
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can be bridged by pro-social empathy and welcome, or the gulf can be widened to amass
political power and impute blame elsewhere.
For the migrants of Bangladesh, as the walls around it rise, the surety of the ground
beneath sinks away, and the wind rises, and the tide comes in, higher than ever before.
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